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Claims to Treaty and other Rights:
Exploring the Terms of
Crown-Maori Negotiation
Nicola White and Andrew Ladley
Introduction
In “The Treaty and Democratic Government”,
published in the previous issue of Policy Quarterly, it
was argued that:
• All political power has limits, with neither the state
(or any branch of it), nor any particular group within
the state, being able to claim absolute power. Rather,
balances of authority within a state are negotiated
and re-negotiated over time.
• Claims by any institution (whether governmental
or tribal) to possess “sovereignty” reflect historical
rhetoric, but our constitutional system is one of
government by consent, within limits.
• In this context, ongoing debates about rangatira-
tanga (here, broadly meaning more tribal self
determination) are a normal and healthy part of
democratic process and the ongoing negotiation of
the terms of government by consent.
This article delves further into that broad framework
by considering the interplay between law and political
negotiation, concepts of relationships between citizen
and state, the role of rights in political debate, and the
effect of concepts of indigeneity on all of these. The
broad conclusion is that current legal and policy debates
are constantly testing what is different about the state’s
relationship with indigenous people, and when, why
and how any difference is relevant. The debate must
take place, but it needs to be approached with care as it
touches on matters that go to the heart of our traditions
of democracy and equality.
Is there a special relationship with
indigenous people?
There are three main ways in which it is argued that the
state has a special relationship with indigenous people
in New Zealand: as a result of the Treaty of Waitangi, as
a result of common law doctrines of customary or
aboriginal rights, and, increasingly, as a result of a quite
distinct fiduciary relationship between a state and
indigenous people living within it. Those strands are
often inter-woven. A critical tension across all of them
is the extent to which Maori can locate their claims in
the field of “rights”, and so claim the protection of the
courts within the heritage of Westminster democracy.
These three strands each need brief discussion.
The Treaty of Waitangi
Whatever the arguments over the exact status and
meaning of the Treaty, it is accepted as a founding
document for New Zealand, articulating the basis on
which colonial government was established with the
consent of the indigenous peoples – Maori tribes – and
setting terms for the continuity of their chieftainships.
Legal developments since the mid 1980s, and the
settlement process for historical grievances, have
dramatically changed the recognition now given to the
Treaty. The promises in the Treaty and the history of
government inaction and direct breach are now much
better understood. That history has begun to be addressed.
But, however important, the settlement process is
essentially backwards looking, concerned with the redress
of grievance. The greater challenge today is to articulate
and workably implement the ongoing responsibilities that
the Treaty may place upon government.
That debate on what that might entail is being played
out in many contexts. It is in the forefront in public
debate around the stocktake of New Zealand’s
constitutional arrangements (currently being carried
out by Parliament’s Constitutional Arrangements
Committee), in the foreshore and seabed policy, and in
the politics triggered by the creation of the Maori Party
to contest the next general election. It is implicit in many
other policy, legislative and administrative issues that
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have a Maori dimension, from climate change and
aquaculture legislation to corrections and immigration
policy. All are opportunities to raise the question of the
balance of autonomy, the role that Maori might have in
any decision-making process, and the question of
whether there are any rights specific to Maori.
The question in all these contexts is what the basic Treaty
promises might mean for ongoing government activity
and policy making. There is now a substantial body of
thinking and writing, in court decisions, Waitangi
Tribunal reports and academic commentary, that can
inform those discussions. That thinking has particularly
developed through discussion of the phrase, “the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi”. The phrase first
appeared in legislation as the guiding phrase in
establishing the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, and has since
been used in many other Acts of Parliament.
In developing the content of Treaty principles, both the
courts and the Tribunal have in general stepped carefully.
Although the Tribunal in particular has made strong
statements over the years about the nature of the Treaty
promises and the breaches of them, when taken to a
conclusion about what is required of the state in a given
situation, both the Tribunal and the courts have tended
to make suggestions about the process rather than the
substance of government decision-making. This can be
seen as a manifestation of the general doctrine of
deference between the branches of government, or a
general awareness of the limitations of the role of the
judicial branch in policy making and an acceptance of
the need for Treaty-based considerations to be blended
with the general governance obligations of the state.
The level of deference from both courts and Tribunal is
less when an issue is focussed around individual pieces
of property with clearly identified owners, reflecting not
only our own ‘Westminster tradition’ but also the
heritage of most ‘rule of law democracies’. At that point
the broad governance issues fall more into the
background and one tends to see greater articulation of
‘rights’ from the courts and the Tribunal.
A key point from the exploration of this strand of activity
is the emerging ‘legalisation’ of the Treaty, and the effect
that is having on the terms of negotiation for Maori
claims for autonomy and resources. ‘Bargaining in the
shadow of litigation’ is common in our democracy –
and Maori well understand this.
Customary rights
The common law has historically protected the rights
of an indigenous people that existed when colonial
government was established, and which have not been
extinguished by any legal process since. The doctrine is
well established in every common law country, but is
particularly vibrant in Australia, Canada and the USA.
The law has been closely tied to property arguments,
rather than more general social issues. Thanks to the
seabed and foreshore, New Zealand has heard much
about customary rights over the last two years.
The emerging consensus in New Zealand is that there
is now limited room for this line of legal reasoning to
play out, for five main reasons.
• First, land-based claims have minimal potential for
customary rights arguments, given the tiny amount
of land that remains in customary title and the settled
understanding that transformation from customary
title to ‘normal ownership’ extinguishes all aspects
of the customary title.
• Second, all claims based on customary fishing rights,
whether commercial or non-commercial, were settled
with the 1992 Sealord deal.
• Third, the exploration of customary rights over the
foreshore and seabed will now take place within a
contained legal framework that blends potential
customary rights with the wider set of legal rules
governing the use and management of this area.
• Fourth, the last remaining geographical context in
which the issues might emerge is that of rivers. Court
of Appeal comments have signalled that it should
not be assumed that the application of English land
law will necessarily have removed all customary rights
over rivers and significant waterways. But past
legislative vestings and and other actions are likely
to mean that the issues, as they get explored, will
prove to be more about historical loss than
contemporary rights.
• Fifth, the continued existence of customary rights
in New Zealand must face the common law
requirement that the claimed rights must not have
fallen into disuse. Outside of the areas already dealt
with by settlement or statute (eg customary food
gathering from the sea), this requirement of
continuity is likely to be hard to satisfy.
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Customary rights jurisprudence is squarely tied to
property and natural resources. But it does link to ‘self-
determination’ arguments, because managing property
with a degree of exclusivity (the core of ‘rights’) has the
potential to give a tribe an economic foundation.  Again,
one should therefore not be surprised that the language
of ‘customary rights’ is becoming integral to the
negotiation of rangatiratanga in New Zealand.
Putting aside property rights, there is no significant
domestic legal argument at present for the recognition
of equivalent customary rights at any broader level of
social policy. Debates about the possible recognition of
broader rights of indigenous people are taking place in
the context of international human rights discourse, and
in particular over the merits of the Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It is logical that
indigenous peoples everywhere, including Maori, attach
great importance to what is otherwise a highly
contentious and consequently very slow-moving
international discussion.
A fiduciary relationship
The concept of a fiduciary operates in many different
legal relationships, including the lawyer-client
relationship, a trustee and beneficiary, and a company
director and shareholders. The details of the duties differ,
but there are some broad principles that allow all those
relationships to be described as fiduciary.
• A fiduciary is not self-regarding, but acts strictly in
the interests of the relevant beneficiaries.
• The person must exercise independent judgment,
as well as meet duties of diligence and prudence in
the way responsibilities are carried out.
• A fiduciary must also be open and accountable to
the beneficiaries for whom he or she is working.
Does the Government of New Zealand owe Maori a
special protective duty, similar to that of a trustee? Put
the other way round, as compared with all other citizens,
can Maori validly assert any “rights” for treatment and
protection, simply by being indigenous?
Internationally, there is an increasing body of literature and
case law on the notion of a special fiduciary relationship
between a state and indigenous peoples living within it.
That development is quite separate from the Waitangi
Tribunal’s consistent suggestion that the principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi imply a special fiduciary duty on the
New Zealand government to ensure the cultural (and
perhaps land-based) viability of every hapu and iwi. The
wider body of thinking has largely emerged from North
American law and political discussion. But each context is
specific and the arguments must be understood within the
rest of the host legal system. Thus one should not assume
that government fiduciary obligations relating to
indigenous peoples are universal concepts that will be easily
applied in New Zealand.
The original use of fiduciary language in this context
was paternalistic, especially in 19th century United
States cases that described the relationship between
the state and Indian tribes as like that between a
guardian and a ward – the state taking decisions for
the good of a vulnerable child-like group. The duties
created by courts were therefore strict about the content
of decisions, in that they were to be for the benefit of
the indigenous people, but had less regard for process
and the idea that the ‘beneficiaries’ might have a role
in decision making. This genesis is a long way from
the contemporary hopes for how the Crown-Maori
relationship might develop.
The Canadian courts have declared there to be a special
fiduciary relationship between its aboriginal peoples and
the state, but have made little progress in setting out its
scope or consequences – when it might apply, and how
sharp its legal teeth might be.
Both commentators and courts in North America have,
however, identified a key difficulty with the notion of
articulating a fiduciary duty of the state to a particular
group. A fiduciary is bound to act strictly in the interests
of the beneficiary group or individual. Yet the
government owes responsibilities to the population at
large. How can the two be reconciled?
From first principles, the general state-citizen
relationship sees the government – through the
mechanism of elections for a Parliament – put in office
by the people. They give it a political mandate, based
on leadership and policies put to the electorate, to govern
according to law.
The political mandate is not of course absolute,
especially in minority and coalition governments. The
mandate is to seek to govern for all, informed by the
principles and approach put to the electorate – and it is
a mandate to govern according to law. The basic position
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was articulated by Edmund Burke, back in 1774, to
the effect that the task of an elected parliamentarian
was to exercise unbiased opinion, mature judgement
and enlightened conscience, for the general good, in
the deliberative assembly of Parliament – not to be a
delegate for a single party or interest group. One can
see a loose parallel here with the broad concept of
fiduciary responsibilities.
In matters of general governance it therefore runs counter
to first principles of democratic theory for the state to
owe a duty of this kind to just one group; the government
must make decisions in the general public good. Put
differently, general notions of non-discrimination in broad
policy areas have come to underlie much of our legal
(and political) system. This is completely different from
the accepted notion that individuals and groups can have
different property rights, and hence protection of those.
And so, unsurprisingly, we see an emerging willingness
in the court judgments to rely on fiduciary relationships
to protect particular pieces of land or other property,
but some reticence in using those concepts in any
broader sphere.
Is the Crown-Maori relationship a legal
or political construct?
This brief survey of the main areas of legal argument
over the recent years shows that the boundary between
the legal and political is fuzzy, and is constantly being
pushed by one group or another. In particular, it is clear
that claimant groups, unsurprisingly, consistently talk
up this set of potential sources of responsibility into
‘rights’ - firm legal concepts that could create enforceable
obligations through courts.  This is so for any group
seeking to make a distinctive claim, not just for Maori.
Thus, parents of children with special needs might seek
to found their claims to educational funding in terms
of “rights” and the state’s special protective obligations
(deduced from the wording of the statute) to provide
equal education for all.
Fiduciary relationships, with their foundation in equity,
are in the realm of ethical and moral values. This strand
illustrates nicely that this debate balances on a pivot
point for the involvement of the law. Against the broad
context painted by this and the previous article, it is
unsurprising that indigenous claims have also turned
to what one writer has described as the seductive lure of
fiduciary law’s “ample and flexible system”.
If one cannot find a specific doctrine appropriate
to the circumstances, but if one is committed to
exacting a protective responsibility, the siren song
of the fiduciary becomes almost irresistible. If the
remedy given by an available doctrine fails to
meet the perceived needs of justice in a given
case, again the temptation surfaces. So like an
accordion the fiduciary principle may be
expanded, or compressed, to maintain the
integrity, credibility and utility of relationships
perceived to be of importance in contemporary
society.  (Tan, 1995)
The role of the legal system in enforcing responsibilities
in these relationships involves delicate and dynamic
questions. There are no fixed answers, here or
internationally. In a democracy of ‘government by
consent, within limits’, this is an ongoing search for a
reasonably acceptable balance between the ethical, social
and legal that suits practical, political and constitutional
considerations – for the time being.
How important are “rights”?
Why does all this matter so much? From a legal perspective
the difference is between general claims (moral, ethical
or political – however one wishes to describe them), and
legal rights that create duties enforceable through the legal
system. The first are ‘soft’ responsibilities - the general
provision of a climate in which business might operate,
or a stable society, or education and health services.
Mostly, this is the stuff of general political debate and
policy trade-off. But ‘rights’ are more hard-edged, and
the holder of the duty will be held legally accountable in
some way for their performance. Legal rights are not soft
feel-goods, to be acknowledged or given by a cabinet or
parliament in the ebb and flow of political influence. In
legal terms, rights deserve capitals: a Right is a Big Deal,
and can have Big Consequences.
For the government, if something is a right, it can act as
a trump in the general round of negotiation and
balancing of different group interests that are part and
parcel of general formulation of policy. If the legal system
declares an interest to be a right, it will carry significant
priority in the policy world. Hence, the right to a fair
trial requires that significant state resources be given to
the provision of legal services for those facing
imprisonment but unable to afford legal counsel, and
to ensuring sufficient courts and judges so that cases
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can be dealt with in a reasonable time.  The ‘right’ has
trumped other claims to resources.  If the state chooses
not to fund such rights, the courts will not convict
people accused of crimes.
But whilst rights might trump other claims, the
complexity arises in that there are always other rights in
play. So the governing system, including executive,
legislature and courts, has to find the appropriate balance
and limits between competing rights.
The point here is that we should not be surprised to
see, or be shy about naming, the same process in Treaty
claims as we see across all other issues: that is, the
tendency for claimants (or those favouring claimants)
to “talk up” the language of rights. As argued throughout
this paper, the language is important, as it vitally affects
the negotiating process in a democratic government.
To take some specific examples in the Treaty context:
• There is a difference between saying that the
relationship established by the Treaty of Waitangi is
a fiduciary one, or akin to a fiduciary one. Crown
lawyers put great weight on “akin”; claimant lawyers
gloss over it.
• Internationally, states have been very cautious about
signing up to the terms of the Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous People, whereas the
international indigenous community (including a
strong Maori lobby) has resisted weakening the
“rights” language of the draft.
• There is recurring debate about the way in which
Bills introduced to Parliament refer to the Treaty. A
dramatic debate in recent years was over the New
Zealand Public Health and Disability Bill introduced
to Parliament in 2000 (see below). Similar policy
debates have taken place over the terms of local
government, land transport, education and genetic
modification legislation, to name but a few.
In all of these examples, what is being debated is the
terms under which claims on the state are to be pursued,
and the position of the indigenous claim relative to those
of other groups in society.
This is an iterative and highly dynamic process,
involving all of the different branches of government.
A soft acknowledgement of interests in a policy
statement or speech by one part of government might
be used as foundation for an argument before a court
to recognise an interest, give it form as a right and
provide redress. The court’s comments on that issue are
used in the policy process to justify a broad reference in
the principles of an Act. Which is then expounded upon
in speeches and policy documents, which then founds
another legal case... And so on, across a diverse range of
policy topics and across domestic and international fora.
In a developing and highly topical area of policy and
law, with few fixed markers, the boundary between
political, policy and legal spheres is highly permeable.
This dynamism, and the difficult line between legal and
moral values, is not unique to New Zealand, or to Treaty
issues. The same concepts have been debated for many
years in the context of international human rights, and
the question of whether different types of rights require
different approaches in law and policy. There will always
be questions about whether to characterise issues of this
kind as legal, and hence which branch of government is
best suited to take the lead on which issues. The baton
changes regularly. It is a complex matrix.
Non-discrimination and special interest
rights
We have argued that in large measure, Maori are simply
doing what every other interest group is doing in the
democratic process, namely bidding up their claims as
“rights” under various headings (the Treaty, customary
rights, fiduciary duties) and bolstering those claims by
political representation aimed at furthering their
interests. Those who assert the uniqueness of the Treaty
will resist a view of Maori as simply claimants amongst
many - and there is some force to that, of course. The
purpose here is not to argue against all aspects of the
special position of Maori groups, or the special place of
the Treaty, but to see those claims in the context of an
ongoing and largely healthy negotiation in this
‘government-by-consent-within-limits’ democracy.
But we need to be more explicit about the boundaries
between the assertion of non-discrimination as a core
value in the political and legal system, and the assertion
of any special rights of Maori. To the extent that Maori
claims are for protection of clearly defined and already
existing property rights, as noted, there is little
jurisprudential or political risk. Everyone understands,
and the law certainly does, that property rights entitle a
measure of special treatment for the holders. This
generally does not raise issues of discrimination.
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But for very good reasons, measured in war and
bloodshed, democratic governments everywhere
have,  especia l ly  over the last  hal f  century,
endeavoured to create governing systems in which
certain criteria are not the basis on which people
either claim rights, or are refused such. The initial
flashpoints were on race/ethnicity and religion. Wars
were – and are – fought based upon special treatment
given or refused on such grounds.
The attempt to prohibit discrimination did not occur
solely for ‘moral’ or ‘fairness’ reasons, or to pursue
colonising agendas. It reflects a deep-seated realisation
that basing core policy and government on group rights
is a ‘zero-sum game’. People who see the world thus are
condemned to play it on its terms. If Jews win,
Palestinians lose, etc. Democracies developed non-
discrimination laws by exhaustion after centuries of
conflict where power was based on certain
characteristics. Thus, the attempt was to provide rules
for competitive power struggle that gave better chances
for all - not just for those who happened to be the holders
of the characteristics that held power.
So, by 2005 the world has strongly affirmed the right to
be free from such discrimination in successive human
rights documents, and has celebrated milestones such as
the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, the successes of the black civil rights movement
in the United States, and the ending of apartheid in South
Africa. In New Zealand today, this right is affirmed in
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and given
protection through the Human Rights Act 1993.
The essence of the right, for government policy making,
is that any differential treatment between ethnic groups,
or the sexes, or age groups, must be for good reason. In
the words of the Bill of Rights Act, it must be “reasonably
justified in a free and democratic society”.
The principle of equal treatment (or freedom from
discrimination) goes to the heart of the values of this
society. Its depth was shown by the heated reaction in
2000 to the New Zealand Public Health and Disability
Bill as it was introduced: it was read by many as allowing
(or even requiring) preferential access to health services
for Maori, solely because of race. The Bill was amended
before enactment to make very clear that this was not to
be a possibility, and related policy changes to this Bill
and other parts of government policy clarified that social
services generally were to be delivered on the basis of need,
not race. If statistics showed that the two coincided, so
that a particular group in society had a clearly greater
need for a service, then a targeted service could be
provided. But without that concrete data, it was unlikely
that differential treatment would meet the Bill of Rights
Act requirement of being reasonably justified.
In practice, of course, this is complex. There is regular
argument about whether any particular programme is
just delivery of the same general service but targeted in
a way that increases its effectiveness with a particular
population group, or whether it is a programme
provided exclusively to that population group – often
as part of a claimed Treaty process.
Thus for the last few years, politics has been dominated
by a potent brew of race, the Treaty, equality,
differentiation, respect for difference, indigenous rights
and affirmative action. The fuzziness of the lines between
one type of treatment and another, in a complex world
with imperfect information, means that there is no perfect
solution that will hold for all time. There will always be
debate about when different treatment is justified. It is a
fine line for any government and society to walk.
Conclusion: distinguishing
between law and leverage
This brief article has touched on many topics, and dealt
in detail with only a few. It must be left to future pieces
to explore such matters as:
• the past, present and future role of the Waitangi
Tribunal,
• the swirling arguments about forms of ownership
and attachment, both historically and now, including
the extent to which it is appropriate to characterise
those attachments as modern property rights,
• the types of policy and law where distinction based
on ethnicity or indigeneity may or may not be
problematic, and
• the consequences and appropriate treatment of
different kinds of rights as international and domestic
lawmakers give legal force to moral values.
The focus here has been on the broad pattern of
engagement or negotiation of Maori claims, and the
terms on which the negotiation is being constructed.
In the end the messages are relatively simple. These issues
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- at the heart of social and political debate in New
Zealand – are at once both unproblematic and hard.
They are unproblematic where Maori claims, including
self-determination, are seen as integral to the democratic
process of negotiation in a rule of law democracy. The
legal issues are the same as for all other claimants, and
the claiming and framing of “rights” is central to that
negotiation. This includes the claimed right to
rangatiratanga, or tribal self-determination. In a
government characterised by limited and relative degrees
of institutional autonomy, it should not be threatening
to negotiate special relativity for groups wishing to
exercise such. Defining a group and confirming its
authority over a specified set of issues or activities is
something that Parliament does regularly, whether for
professional bodies like Law Societies, for local
government, or for incorporated societies and charitable
trusts like squash clubs or the RSA.
But the issues will always be hard when the boundaries
of differential treatment are based on race. The
treatment of different groups of people by the state goes
to the heart of some deep social norms of non-
discrimination and justice. It is not surprising that their
exploration is creating some heat.
By and large, all branches of government within New
Zealand have - so far - managed to weave ideas of some
special position of indigenous people within the fabric of
the general social, legal, constitutional, and political
framework of society. But this is undoubtedly a tightrope.
There have been some wobbles. Avoiding more will
require each step in this area to be taken carefully. A step
wrong, on either side of the wire, could be uncomfortable.
To pursue the metaphor, each actor also needs to be
aware that they are not the only ones on this particular
tightrope. All of this debate takes place in the complex
and multi-layered environment of tipping point between
social, political and legal zones. The issues bounce
constantly between the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government, with action by one often
having immediate consequence for another.
Language is vitally important in this ‘claiming context’,
as terminology, in particular the use of the language of
rights, can push claims from the political into the legal
zone. The line between ‘soft’ responsibilities and ‘hard’
legal rights is being debated and pushed every week, as
these issues come to the fore.
It would therefore be naïve to see the law as a separate
and pure source of absolute propositions, generally, and
in this topic in particular. There is no hidden tablet of
stone in the judicial common room. It has to be
understood that these issues are being explored in New
Zealand in a highly dynamic conversation. All three
branches of government are taking part in this
conversation, as are international fora. All parties to the
debate are using all of these fora to promote and defend
their own perspectives, more or less consciously.
If this is accepted, it becomes critical that all participants
in this national conversation are aware of the use that
will be made of any formal utterances, and aware of the
overall broad social and political context into which their
particular pebble will drop. Precise language is critical.
So is basic respect between peoples. We are negotiating
both dignity and claim. They deserve respectful, careful
and deliberate discussion.
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